Afin d'évaluer le niveau initial et l'évolution au cours du temps de la taxe carbone qui permettrait une division par quatre des émissions françaises de gaz à effet de serre (le « facteur 4 »), nous construisons, calibrons et simulons un modèle d'équilibre général de petite taille dans lequel les consommations d'énergie fossile sont explicites. Les élasticités de substitution entre l'énergie fossile et les autres biens et facteurs sont estimées pour les mé-nages et les entreprises. Nous développons successivement deux versions du modèle : dans la première, le progrès technique est exogène ; son orientation vers le travail ou l'énergie est endogène dans la seconde. Nos simulations indiquent que si le progrès technique progresse au rythme constaté au cours d'un historique récent, la taxe carbone qu'il faudrait introduire pour atteindre le facteur 4 se situerait à un niveau largement trop élevé pour être envisageable. Lorsque l'orientation du progrès technique répond de manière endogène à des incitations économiques, à savoir l'augmentation du prix des énergies fossiles, les réduc-tions des émissions sont plus marquées, mais ne peuvent toutefois pas être raisonnablement divisées par quatre. Un tel infléchissement serait possible en introduisant un instrument supplémentaire, sous la forme d'une subvention à la recherche sur les économies d'énergie.
Non technical summary
France, as many other countries, committed to reduce by at least 75% its greenhouse gases emissions by 2050 compared to the 1990 level. To achieve this ambitious objective, the settlement of market mechanisms based on the increase in the price of fossil fuels -whether carbon taxes or emissions trading systems -, appear inevitable. A situation with low fossil fuel prices seems indeed incompatible with a significant decrease in their utilization, and supply-demand factors are not likely to be sufficient for triggering the necessary price increase. But what should be the initial level and the time path of the tax for the consumption of fossil fuels to be reduced by a factor of four in the long run?
In France, this question has been addressed by an official commission (the Quinet commission) in 2008. According to the commission, the carbon value should start at 32 e per tonne of CO2
and grow at about 5% per year to reach around 200 e in 2050, which roughly corresponds to a 100% add-on to the price before tax. The results were based on simulations performed by large scale multi sectors models. But due to the complexity of the models, their large size and their sectoral disaggregation, it is difficult to understand some of their assumptions and conclusions.
In particular, the substitution possibilities between energy and other goods, and the implicit average rate of energy-saving technical progress cannot be easily identified.
Since those assumptions have a major impact on the carbon value necessary to achieve the emission-reduction objective, we build a simplified general equilibrium macroeconomic model, sufficiently aggregated so as to ensure that assumptions about technical progress and substitution possibilities are explicit and their influence can be easily analyzed. Using French annual historical data , we estimate the elasticity of substitution between fossil energy and other goods and services, and the rates of labor-saving and energy-saving technical progress.
Making the hypothesis that those rates equal the average historical values estimated (respectively 1.6% and 2% a year), we simulate the impact on emissions of the carbon tax proposed in the Quinet report. We obtain that such a tax would only yield a 25% reduction in emissions.
We then consider that the tax stimulates the energy-saving technical progress. Even with this mechanism, emissions would only be curbed by 40
The conclusion we can draw from our simulations is that a reduction of emissions by 75% is very difficult to achieve for France. Such a reduction indeed requires that energy-saving technical progress grow at a high rate that has never been reached in the past. This will not occur without an important effort which is likely to come at some cost. We wonder if existing large applied models commonly used to study environmental policy are not misleading in the sense that they under-estimate the magnitude of the effort required. and asserted on numerous occasions and in various documents the need to develop long-term strategies to encourage the transition to a low carbon economy. These unilateral commitments are not sufficient per se to efficiently tackle climate change, but if they prove to be successful, they could prompt other countries to act in turn and unlock international negotiations.
However, major uncertainties exist at this stage about the cost and even the feasibility of this objective. The debate on the adequate mix of instruments (market instruments, standards, public investments, R&D efforts, etc.) that should be implemented in order to attain such reductions at a reasonable cost is still ongoing.
Market instruments, based on the increase in the price of fossil fuels, are often presented as promising tools to achieve ambitious GHG reductions, because they are economically efficient.
Whatever mix of instruments is chosen, these market instruments nevertheless appear inevitable: a situation with low fossil fuel prices indeed seems incompatible with a significant decrease in their utilisation. It may be posited that the necessary price increase will occur naturally due to supply-demand factors and that no additional policy is necessary. Even if this happens to be true, which is very unlikely, the question remains: what should the consumer price of fossil fuels be for their consumption to be reduced by a factor of four in the long run?
This question has of course been already addressed. In France, an official commission chaired by Alain Quinet was set up in 2008, with the aim of determining the social value of carbon that should be used by the French government in the cost-benefit analysis for public investments (see Quinet (2009) ). The approach adopted was to determine the carbon value that should be applied to the whole economy, so as to achieve a 75% reduction in emissions, i.e. the question addressed above. The commission used the results of simulations performed by three French integrated assessment models, GEMINI-E3 (Vielle & Bernard (1998) ), POLES (Criqui et al. (2006) ) and IMACLIM-R (Sassi et al. (2010) ), which computed the initial level and the time path of the carbon value that would allow European economies to reduce their carbon emissions by a factor of four at a forty-year horizon. GEMINI-E3 is a sectoral Computable General Equilibrium model, POLES an extremely detailed bottom-up model, and IMACLIM-R, a hybrid model. Their level of disaggregation and detail allows them to provide an accurate description of sectoral and even sometimes microeconomic effects. Nevertheless, due to their complexity, it is difficult to understand the precise origin of their results, which vary greatly across the three models. As regards the questions we wish to address here, the three models include assumptions on the substitution possibilities in the different sectors of the economy and on the magnitude of sectoral energy-saving technical progress, which is either exogenous or driven by learning-by-doing effects. These assumptions have a major influence on the results obtained. However, the complexity of the models, their large size and in particular their sectoral disaggregation are such that it is impossible to deduce, from these assumptions, information such as the implicit average rate of energy-saving technical progress. However, for given substitution possibilities, energy-saving technical progress naturally decreases the carbon value necessary to achieve the emission-reduction objective. It is therefore very important to start with an accurate estimate of the substitution possibilities, and then to disentangle clearly the role of the instrument from that of technical progress to achieve this objective.
We build here a stylized macroeconomic model, sufficiently aggregated so as to ensure that assumptions about technical progress are explicit and their influence can be easily analysed.
We model an open economy producing a generic good, which can be consumed or invested, and importing fossil fuel as its sole source of energy 1 . Whereas, usually, energy is only considered to be an input in the production process, we also introduce here households' consumption of fossil fuels, and the fact that fossil fuels are used together with durable goods. This consumption includes residential energy and fuel for transport. Transport and, to a lesser extent, housing sectors are indeed the larger emitters and have been until now unable to reduce their GHG emissions in France (see Table 1 ). Both rely heavily on fossil fuel and it seems important to take them properly into account.
Final or intermediate fossil energy consumption can be reduced either by substitutions triggered by an increase in the consumer energy price or by technical progress. Substitution possibilities exist between energy, durable goods and non-durable goods on the households' side, and between energy, capital and labour on the production side. However, these substitution possibilities are limited. The other option is to rely on fossil energy-saving technological progress.
Therefore, we introduce two forms of technical progress, respectively labour-saving and energysaving. The energy-saving technical progress we consider consists of both improvements in energy efficiency and the replacement of fossil fuels by renewables. Thus, we do not explicitly introduce renewables in the model.
We present two versions of the model.
In Section 2, we develop the first version, with exogenous technical progress. put in place in our simulations, namely the increase in fossil fuel consumer prices, have no impact on the rate of fossil energy-saving technical progress, and that no specific policy aimed at increasing this rate is implemented.
We perform three simulations. In the first, the rate of energy saving technical progress equals the average historical value obtained in the estimate, and we introduce the carbon tax proposed in the Quinet report. It shows that this tax path is far from sufficient to reduce CO 2 emissions by a factor of four at a forty-year horizon. It only yields a 25% reduction in emissions. Hence, we conclude that in large applied models there are more substitution possibilities and/or more energy-saving technical progress than in our model. In the second simulation, we determine what the magnitude of an oil shock would have to be in order to reach the same level of reductions as with the tax, and compare the consequences of this oil shock to those of the carbon tax. In the last simulation, we increase exogenously the rate of fossil energy-saving technical progress sufficiently to reduce emissions by a factor of four with the carbon tax recommended in the Quinet report. The rate of fossil energy-saving technical progress must be greatly (unreasonably) increased to reach Factor 4. This exercise remains unsatisfactory since this increase in the technical progress rate is costless, and does not occur at the expense of the other rate of technical progress in the model, the labour-saving technical progress.
In Section 3, we incorporate an endogenous mechanism into the model, so that the rate of technical progress on fossil energy can be stimulated by a price effect and by a size effect of the research effort directed at saving fossil energy. The rate of technical progress associated with energy use is indeed likely to be closely correlated with the level of the energy price.
Technical progress is not fully endogeneised: the total amount of resources devoted to research is exogenous. We analyze the extent to which the endogeneisation of the direction of technical change affects the results obtained in the first exercise.
We perform similar simulations as in the previous section. The results are as follows. When the direction of technical progress is endogenous, the introduction of the carbon tax induces a re- 
The model with exogenous technical progress
The first version of the model consists in a standard exogenous growth model integrating fossil fuel use both on the households and firms' side, rigidities in the adjustment of the housing and the productive sectors, and two types of technical progress, respectively labor and energysaving. We describe successively households' and firms' behaviour and the closure of the model, the calibration method and results, and the simulations performed.
Households
Several macroeconomists have emphasized that distinguishing non-durable and durable goods is important to obtain an accurate representation, both on a theoretical and an empirical point of view, of households' consumption and savings decisions along their life cycle. Ogaki & Reinhart (1998) for instance show that introducing separately non-durable and durable goods modifies very significantly the estimation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
More recently, Fernández-Villaverde & Krueger (2011) survey the empirical literature and also conclude that the distinction is meaningful. These papers do not distinguish households' energy consumption from the consumption of other non-durable goods. We think that separating energy consumption considerably reinforces the importance of distinguishing between non-durable and durable goods, because durables almost only need energy to deliver their services whereas non-durables do not. These two types of goods are very different to that respect.
We thus consider that households have access to three types of goods: non-durable goods N , energy (fossil fuels) E and durable goods D. Non-durable goods are consumed during the period, whereas durable goods can be stored or have a long lifespan. Contrary to non-durables and energy, durable goods follow an accumulation process of the standard form 3 :
where X t represents the investment in durable goods at period t and δ d is the rate of depreciation.
3 The model is simulated with the Dynare software (Adjemian et al. (2011) ), which adopts the convention that for stock variables the default is to use a stock at the end of the period. Our definition of Dt follows: Dt represents the stock of durable goods at the end of period t, i.e. that will be used by households in the following period t + 1. The same convention will apply for productive capital and other stock variables.
Utility at period t is a function of the consumptions of non-durable goods N t and energy E h,t in that period, and of the services provided by the stock of durable goods D t−1 at the beginning of the period, these services being supposed to be proportional to the stock itself:
where C t is defined by:
Z h,t being a CES aggregate of services provided by durables goods D t−1 and efficient energy consumption A e t E h,t :
A e represents energy efficiency.
Changing the stock of durable goods induces adjustment costs. We make the assumption that these costs are nil along a balanced growth path, so that households bear them only if they have to deviate from the "normal" trajectory of the economy. These costs are classically specified as:
where g al is the growth rate of labor productivity, which will turn out to be the long term growth rate of the economy 4 .
At each period, the representative household can buy or sell bonds which pay or cost a nominal rate r t . We denote A t−1 the nominal value of bonds possessed at the beginning of period t.
Households revenues also consist in labour revenues (P l t L t ) and lump-sum transfers from the government T t .
The budget constraint at period t reads, with obvious notations for the various prices:
where τ c is the tax rate on the consumption of goods and τ h the additive tax on households' energy consumption.
The representative household seeks to maximize the discounted sum of its utilities under the intertemporal budget constraint:
where µ > 0 is the discount rate. The no-Ponzi condition 5 reads:
We choose a logarithmic utility function:
t be the user cost of the stock of durable goods:
with π
The FOC can be written as one forward-looking inter-temporal arbitrage and two static arbitrages between the three consumption goods:
Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive. They produce the generic good using capital, labor and fossil fuels, according to the following specification:
As for the stock of durable goods, changing the stock of capital leads to adjustment costs, specified as:
5 We do not impose explicitly in Dynare the no-Ponzi condition, but simply verify that it is satisfied in the simulations.
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The problem of the representative firm reads:
s.c. (12), (13) with τ f the tax on firms' energy consumption, possibly different from the tax τ h paid by households.
Let P k t be the user cost of capital:
FOC simply state that the marginal productivity of the inputs are equal to their real cost:
Government
The government receives tax receipts and reimburses them lump sum to households, so that its budget is balanced at each date:
Closure
The equilibria on the generic good market and the labor market respectively read:
Note that adjustment costs are costs in terms of the generic good. Exportations of the generic good are denoted EX t . They are proportional to an exogenous foreign demand for the good D t , and respond to a relative price effect:
where P t is the exogenous price of the generic good in the rest of the world in foreign currency, er t the exchange rate and ξ the price elasticity of exports.
Fossil fuels are totally imported. We do not model the extraction behaviour of producers and consider that the producer price in foreign currency P e t is exogenous and grows at a constant rate, in order to reflect the increasing scarcity of non-renewable resources and to mimic a Hotelling-type behaviour. The price of fossil fuels in domestic currency is P e t = erP e t . er t adjusts at each date as to ensure the equilibrium of the trade balance:
Starting from the household's budget constraint (5) and using successively the government's budget constraint (18), the zero profit condition of firms, the equilibrium condition on the good market (19), the expressions of I and AC f in terms of the capital stock K (equations (12) and (13)) and the expression of the user cost of capital (14), we obtain:
This equation, together with the initial condition 6 A 0 = P i 0 K 0 , allows us to obtain the relationship between household's financial wealth and the stock of capital at each date t > 0:
The model in standard variables is composed of equations (1) to (22). We choose the production price as numeraire:
Long term
In this version of the model, the growth rates of labor productivity g al and of energy efficiency g ae are exogenous and constant. The price of energy in foreign currency, and hence its growth rate, are exogenous.
We want to describe an economy evolving in the long run along a balanced growth path 7 .
The common growth rate of the real economic variables, including efficient energy demands, is necessarily g al , the exogenous rate of labor-augmenting technical progress. Energy efficiency growing at rate g ae , gross energy demands have to grow at rate (1 + g al )/(1 + g ae ) − 1. Prices (and the exchange rate) are stationary except for P l and P e , which respectively grow at rates g al and g ae . Moreover, the fact that A, T, τ h E h and τ f E f must grow in the long run at rate g al yields that taxes on energy τ h and τ f have to grow at rate g ae . Finally, foreign demand D must grow at rate g al .
The requirement that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path in the long run is thus very restrictive. The energy price, in foreign currency and in domestic currency, must grow at the same rate than energy efficiency, which suggests introducing an endogenous technical progress induced by the energy price. Taxes on energy must also grow at this same rate 8 . Fossil energy consumption may decrease or increase, depending on the respective magnitudes of g al and g ae .
Model in intensive variables
We note
We normalize L = 1. We introduce new variables which are stationary in the long run:
The equations of the model in intensive variables read:
8 Remember that energy taxes are here unit taxes; ad valorem taxes would have to remain constant.
Equation (E23) is here just to ensure that the model is well specified: wal t must be at each date equal to 0.
Estimations and calibration
The elasticities of substitution are central parameters which largely influence the simulation results. In the same way, assumptions on the rates of technical progress are determining.
Thus, both for households' utility function and firms' production function, we perform an estimation of these elasticities and rates on French data. On the households' side, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between durable goods and energy, together with the average rate of technical progress related to households' energy use. Concerning the elasticity of substitution between non-durable goods and the aggregation of durable goods and energy, we choose a unitary elasticity. On the firms' side, we estimate the elasticities of substitution in each CES function, together with the rates of technical progress on labor and energy.
Elasticities of substitution of households' utility function

Method and results
We choose a unitary elasticity of substitution (ω in equation (2) Concerning the elasticity of substitution between durable goods and energy (ǫ), Dhawan & Jeske (2008) find an elasticity of 0.26 for the United States by matching the theoretical volatility of households' energy use to the one observed in the data. We do not rely on their result because contrary to them, we include building in durable stocks, which is likely to impact the value of the elasticity. We perform an estimation of this elasticity, using a cointegration relation as Ogaki & Reinhart (1998) . They indeed stress that the long run information identified by the cointegration relation is appropriate when dealing with durable goods because adjustment costs, although significant, do not affect the long run behaviour of consumption of durable goods. They add that this method avoids the computation of the user cost of durable goods P d on the estimation sample, involving an expectation operator which is difficult to deal with.
For the purpose of this estimation, we show in Appendix A that ǫ . The estimation of the relation gives the elasticity of substitution ǫ between durable goods and fossil energy, together with the average rate of technical progress related to households' energy use. We obtain ǫ = 0.50 and g ae = 1.6% per year. Thus, we find that fossil energy and the services from durables are poorly substitutable. Notice that with a rate of fossil energysaving technical progress of 1.6% per year, with no economic growth, fossil fuel consumption would be divided only by 1.9 in 40 years! And 87 years would be necessary to reach the Factor 4 objective. If the economy keeps on growing, the decrease in fossil fuel consumption allowed by fossil energy-saving technical progress, if this rate remains the same as in historical data, will be even further from the 75% reduction in 40 years.
Data
We use data from the French national statistics administration (INSEE) for the period 1959-2010. In national accounts, durable goods are composed of furniture and consumers' equipment such as cars, television sets, refrigerators, etc. To include housing in the stock of durables, we build X t as the sum of consumption of durable goods and of households' investment, which corresponds to housing investment. The price index P x t is built using the chained price methodology with elementary price indexes of housing investment and durable goods consumption. For E h,t , we cut off fossil energy consumption from consumption by product provided in national accounts. This cannot be performed exactly with the energy split provided, since electricity is considered as a whole. Taking into account the fact that the share of electricity from fossil origin is very small in France, we totally exclude electricity in our computation. The price is built with the chained price methodology. Note that index prices include taxes on consumption.
In particular the price index of fossil energy includes taxes on energy. In the simulation section, we provide details on the decomposition of the price between gross price and taxes.
Elasticities of substitution in the production function Method and results
We follow van der Werf (2008), see Appendix B.
The rate of labor saving technical progress is found to lie between g al = 1.5% and g al = 1.6%, depending on the data we take. We estimate g ae between 2.4% and 2.7%. As we assume that the rate of fossil energy-saving technical progress is the same for households' consumption and for production, and given that we found a rate of technical progress of 1.6% for households, we retain a uniform rate of energy-saving technical progress g ae = 2.0%. We find an elasticity of substitution of σ = 0.5 between capital (K) and fossil fuel use for production (E f ). We find an elasticity of substitution of ρ = 0.5 between L and Z f . In order to reinforce the result, we also follow the methodology of Ogaki & Reinhart (1998) to estimate the long term elasticity between K and E f and find similar results.
We find that fossil energy, capital and labor are rather complement for production. The only way to reduce fossil energy consumption without decreasing production is to increase energy efficiency, thanks to fossil energy-saving technical progress. Note that we find that the rate of fossil energy-saving technical progress is larger than the rate of labor-saving technical progress.
As a result, without any intervention, fossil energy use is progressively reduced, but at a small rate: 0.4% per year. With this rate of decline in fossil fuel use, the 75% reduction target would be reached in 347 years.
Data
We use data on labour, labour cost, value-added and price of value-added from INSEE. We use data on the stock of capital from OECD. The user cost of capital is foregone interest plus depreciation minus capital gain. Here the interest rate is the nominal bond rate (IMF), and capital gain is the growth rate of the price of investment in capital from INSEE. In order to have the total stock of energy from fossil fuels, we use data from INSEE on intermediate good consumption. However, the disaggregation of these tables does not allow us to have the total use (and price) of energy from fossil fuels, because gas is aggregated with water and electricity.
We use data on gas consumption from CEREN and gaz price from pegase (French ministry of sustainable development) in order to reconstitute total consumption of fossil fuel energy. We run the regression from year 1986 (data on gas are only available from this date) to year 2008.
Calibration of the other parameters
The calibration procedure is standard. We choose a rate of time preference µ = 3% which, together with g al = 1.6%, corresponds to a steady state annual interest rate of 4.6%. We follow Fernández-Villaverde & Krueger (2011) for the annual depreciation rate of durable goods:
We use a standard value for the depreciation of productive capital: δ k = 10%. We assume that the price elasticity of exports is equal to 0.6, as in Klein & Simon (2010 
Simulations: carbon taxes for Factor 4
In France, the international community's objective of keeping the average global temperature In the Quinet Report, the proposed values across time for the carbon tax are the following: This corresponds roughly to an increase of 3.9% and 6.2% per year to reach respectively 150 e and 350 e within 40 years, starting at 32 e. In order to implement these scenarios, we need to link the price of carbon to taxes expressed as a percentage of the fossil fuel energy price before tax, as defined in the model with τ h and τ f . For this purpose, we use the emission factor for each fuel, expressed in kg of CO 2 per hl. We can then infer the price of a carbon tax per hl, which we can compare to the price before tax. Table 9 in Appendix C presents the impact of a tax of 32 e per tonne of CO 2 , which is the initial level proposed by Quinet. Weighting each value by the relative consumption, a 32 e tax corresponds to an increase of 15% of the price before tax.
The results are proportional for any given level of the tax. Consequently, while 32 e per tonne corresponds to 15% of the price before tax, 100 e leads to around a 50% increase, and 200 e to a 100% increase. Note that these numbers are the same, whether we consider firms or households, since the price before tax is almost the same.
We study three scenarios: the carbon tax of the Quinet Report, an oil shock of equivalent magnitude, and a combination of the Quinet carbon tax and energy-saving technical progress that allows carbon emissions to be reduced by a factor of four within forty years (Factor 4).
The simulations are performed without adjustment costs 9 , on the durable side as well as on the capital side. We expect that this makes it easier to achieve the desired emission reduction objective, since the economy is flexible and can adapt its durable and capital stocks readily to the new energy price.
Method
Long term limitations, which are inherent to this type of models, have important implications for the simulations. On a balanced growth path, all real variables necessarily grow at the same pace. In particular, A e E h and A e E f grow at the same rate as other real variables, i.e g al . The difference between g al and g ae has significant implications on long term energy consumption.
If energy efficiency grows faster than the economy, then in the long run energy use will tend towards zero. On the contrary, if it grows more slowly, then energy use will tend towards infinity.
If we refer to our estimation, g ae > g al in the initial steady state. It means that without any intervention, energy use will be gradually and regularly reduced at a rate (1 + g ae )/(1 + g al ),
and in the long run, we would have E h = E f = 0. Thus, we do not analyze the transition between the initial and the final steady states, but rather between the initial steady state and the economy after 40 years, i.e the horizon at which we want to reduce emissions by 75%.
At t = 0, the economy is on a balanced growth path. We have the same expression between (A e e f ) 40 and (A e e f ) 0 . In order to reach these reductions, we simulate the effect of a permanent tax, starting today and proportional to the oil price (so that the tax grows at the same rate as P e ). Moreover, we add, in some simulations, an increase of the rate of technical progress directed toward energy A e during 40 years, from 2010 until 2050.
Simulation 1: Carbon tax of the Quinet Report
In this first simulation, we simulate the impact of the carbon tax proposed in the Quinet Report.
The initial level of this tax is 32 e/tCO 2 in 2010, growing then at a rate of 4% per year. It adds 0.15 to the initial tax (for a price of 1, the initial tax represents 0.77 for households and 0.26 for firms) in the model, as explained in Appendix C. The results are presented in Tables 4   and 5 . In Table 4 , we see that this tax alone is not sufficient to generate a 75% reduction in oil consumption and would only result in a 25% reduction by 2050. This can be attributed to the restricted substitution possibilities and the low rate of fossil energy saving technical progress. Table 4 also presents a measure ϕ of the welfare gains/losses associated with the policy shock.
ϕ is calculated as the equivalent percentage gain/loss of consumption over forty years. The welfare loss associated with the first simulation is equivalent to a forty-year consumption loss of 0.73 %. The welfare loss is thus relatively small, as is the decrease in fossil fuel consumption.
Details on the impact of this Quinet tax on economic variables over time are presented in the two first columns of Table 5 . Initially, the increase in energy prices leads to a decrease in energy consumption by households (E h ) and energy use by firms (E f ). This price shock also results in a decrease in durables (D), as D and E h are complements. However, as non-durables N and the aggregate composed of durables and energy are more substitutable (the elasticity of substitution equals 1), the initial increase in energy prices leads to an increase in consumption of non-durables via a substitution effect. On the production side, production factors are not very substitutable, so that production falls rapidly. At the end of the shock, after 40 years, all variables are below their baseline value, except for the exchange rate. The fall in energy consumption leads to a decrease in the value of imports. The relative price of domestic goods, compared to foreign goods, increases so that the decrease in exports offsets the decrease in imports. We want to know whether an exogenous increase in the producer price of oil would have the same effects as a carbon tax. We simulate the consequences of such a shock, calibrated so as to ensure a 26% reduction in emissions by 2050, for comparability with Simulation 1. Remember that, in the baseline, the exogenous foreign oil price increases at a rate of 2%. We assume that the shock on the oil price is as follows: from date 1 to date 40, the foreign oil price is the sum of the baseline price (increasing at a rate of 2%) and an additional price component increasing at a rate of 4% (as the Quinet tax in Simulation 1). To ensure a 26% reduction in emissions by 2050, the initial value of this additional price component must equal 40% of the baseline price, to be compared to 15% added to the baseline price in Simulation 1.
There are two main differences with Simulation 1: (1) the carbon tax in Simulation 1 provides the government with tax receipts, whereas the oil shock benefits the foreign economy, (2) the exchange rate increases in the case of the carbon tax, whereas it decreases in the case of the oil shock. Because of the exchange rate adjustment, the additional price component needed to achieve a 26% reduction in emissions is larger than with the Quinet tax. Because of the possibility of recycling the tax proceeds in Simulation 1, the welfare loss is larger in Simulation 2, for the same emission reduction. This loss is equivalent to a forty-year decrease of 2.03% in consumption (see column 2 of Table 4 ).
Details on the impact of this oil shock on economic variables over time are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 . As in the former simulation, the increase in the energy price leads to a decrease in energy consumption by households (E h ) and energy use by firms (E f ). This price shock also entails a decrease in durables (D), as D and E h are complements. Contrary to Simulation 1, even if non-durables N and the aggregate composed of durables and energy are more substitutable, the initial increase in the energy price leads to a decrease in the consumption of non-durables. This is the case because the revenue effect is larger than the substitution effect.
On the production side, production falls but less than in Simulation 1. This can be attributed to the increase in exports (in Simulation 1, there was a decrease in exports). Indeed, the exchange rate decreases in this simulation, contrary to Simulation 1. The increase in the foreign energy price leads to an increase in the value of imports. The relative price of domestic goods, compared to foreign goods, decreases so that the increase in exports offsets the increase in imports.
Simulation 3: Factor 4
Given the results of the first two simulations, the question arises as to how to ensure emissions can be reduced by a factor of four. There are two ways in the model to achieve greater reductions:
increase taxes or increase the rate of energy-saving technical progress. We find that the initial level of the carbon tax that would allow the economy to achieve a 75% reduction in emissions would be obviously too high to be acceptable (i.e. +3.9 instead of +0.15, or 832 e per tonne of CO 2 instead of 32 e ). We then run a third simulation, aimed at determining the rate of technical progress necessary to achieve Factor 4: we simulate the impact of the carbon tax in the Quinet Report, as in Simulation 1, associated with an increase in g ae , with this increase being calibrated to ensure that emissions are reduced by a factor of 4 by 2050. This simulation is interesting because assumptions about the energy-saving technical progress introduced in applied models used to assess the effects of climate policy are often specific to sectors of the economy and can vary across time. It is therefore very difficult to sum up these assumptions to obtain the implicit average growth rate of the energy-saving technical progress in these simulations. We find that this new g ae is equal to 7.4% per year, instead of 2% in the baseline.
The results of this simulation (Simulation 3) are presented in the third column of Table 4 and in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 . It is interesting to note that the initial increase of g ae leads to an initial increase in E f and E h , due to a rebound effect.
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The main conclusion from these simulations is that the target of 75% cannot be reached without additional energy-saving technical progress. In Simulation 3, the energy directed-technical progress is exogenous and free, so that increasing g ae only yields positive benefits. The welfare gain associated with this simulation is equivalent to a 9.88% consumption gain for forty years.
We think that this is misleading. That is why we constructed a second version of the model, in which the direction of technical progress is endogeneised, so that increasing fossil energy-saving technical progress is costly.
The model with directed technical change
We now model directed technical change, in the sense that an increase of the energy price (due to an exogenous supply shock or an increase in environmental taxation) induces R&D aimed at saving energy, at the expense of R&D aimed at increasing labour productivity. Popp (2004) , for instance, provides empirical evidence of this partial crowding-out effect.
We make the assumption that the research effort of the economy is a given proportion of output: we do not endogeneise the intensity of this effort 10 . Nevertheless, given the total amount of resources devoted at each date to R&D, we endogeneise the direction of technical progress, that is the allocation of this amount between an energy research sector enhancing the efficiency of energy and a labour research sector enhancing the efficiency of labour. This direction responds endogenously to economic incentives. It shapes, to a very great extent, the future characteristics of the economy, as there is now a trade-off between economic growth and energy transition. Indeed, a high labour-saving technical progress ensures a high growth rate of the economy but may result in high CO 2 emissions, whereas a high energy-saving technical progress enables the economy to reduce CO 2 emissions by more than substitution possibilities would allow, but would possibly not allow a high overall growth rate to be achieved.
The direction of technical progress
The intensity of the research effort of the economy (in terms of the final good) is constant, exogenous and denoted φ, with 0 < φ < 1. S t = φY t is the level of the research effort. By construction, it grows at the same rate than Y t , i.e. at rate g al t .
We endogeneize the allocation of this amount to an "energy research" sector (S e t ) and to a "labor research" sector (S l t ). To this purpose, we introduce the share sh t = S l t /S t .
We build on Smulders & de Nooij (2003) , and Acemoglu et al. (2012) . 
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The productive sector is composed of three types of firms: final goods producers, intermediate goods producers and firms doing research. We present successively the three optimization programs.
At any date, final goods producers use an homogeneous stock of capital (K), labour services (Y L ) and energy services (Y R ) to produce final goods (Y ). The three inputs are imperfect substitutes, and we adopt the same two-level CES disaggregation than in the first version of the model, with σ = ρ :
The price of the final good is normalized to one and the (accounting) prices of labour and energy services are denoted P y L and P y E , respectively. Final goods producers maximize profits, taking prices as given. They demand labour services, energy services and all-purpose capital up to the point where the marginal productivity of these inputs equals their cost. This yields:
The demand for energy services relative to labor services is a function of their relative prices.
In a second stage, the services of labor (energy) are obtained by combining 11 raw labor L (raw fossil energy E) and a continuum of sector-specific intermediates
Thus we suppose that there exist 3 types of machines: all-purpose homogeneous machines, which total stock is K, and specialized sector-specific machines x i k 12 . All those machines are produced using the final good only. The interpretation of these sector-specific intermediates is the following. For the production of labor services, these specialized machines are mainly machines embodying ITC. For the production of energy services, they can be either devices aimed at improving the energy efficiency of existing capital, or specialized capital allowing to produce renewable energy, like solar cells or wind mills. Both allow to produce the same amount of energy services with less fossil energy.
11 We suppose that the parameter characterizing this combination, λ, is the same for labor and energy services.
This assumptions does not have any theoretical or empirical basis and is only made for simplicity, as it is the case in the rest of the literature. 12 As it is the case in the rest of the literature, again, we treat these sector-specific machines as a flow and not a stock, which would be obviously a better assumption.
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Final goods producers choose how to produce labor and energy services. For labor services for instance, they solve the following problem:
The FOC read:
and for energy services we obtain equivalently:
In a third stage, specialized intermediates are supplied by firms in monopolistic competition -the research sector-. Producing one unit of these machines costs c units of the final good.
Firms producing intermediates aimed at enhancing labor productivity maximize their profit, taking into account the inverse demand function (30):
s.c. (29) FOC yield:
and profit writes
with
the average productivity of specialized inputs, and, using the FOC on raw labor (30):
The accounting price of labor services is a Cobb-Douglas combination of the effective price of labor in efficiency units and of the unit production cost of intermediates.
We obtain equivalent equations for the other research sector:
with τ r the subsidy to the energy research sector, which we introduce as a new potential economic policy instrument, and
Dividing (36) by (34) yields:
The relative price of energy and labor services depends positively on the relative price of raw inputs and also on the relative productivities of the 2 types of specialized machines. The higher the relative productivity of fossil energy-saving specialized inputs, the lower the relative price of energy services.
Dividing (35) by (33) yields: (25) and (38) yields:
Replacing in this equation P yL and P yE by their expressions in (34) and (36) yields:
As in Acemoglu et al. (2012) , productivities evolve according to 13 :
where γ L and γ E are the sizes of an innovation in each research sector, sh the normalized research effort in the research sector aimed at enhancing labor productivity, η L the probability of success in this research sector, and η E the probability of success in the other research sector 14 .
These equations read equivalently:
13 We do not adopt exactly the same timing as in Acemoglu et al. (2012) . We make the assumption, which we find plausible, that the research effort of period t − 1, and not of period t, determines the productivity level of period t.
14 Note that the model can be also seen as an adoption model instead of a research model. In this case, France does not develop new technologies but adopts existing technologies from other countries. Adoption is costly. In order to incorporate a new intermediate good into the production process, it is necessary to invest resources: η is the probability of succeeding in adapting existing technologies to French production process and sh the relative spending to buy new patents from foreign countries. See Grossman & Helpman (1993) .
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The expected profit of research aimed at enhancing labor productivity is:
and we have an equivalent expression for Π e t . Dividing both equations yields:
(45) Acemoglu et al. (2012) identify 3 effects in this relationship, shaping the incentive to innovate in labor-saving technologies versus fossil energy-saving technologies: the direct productivity effect (captured by the term A l t−1 /A e t−1 ), which pushes towards innovating in the sector with higher productivity; the price effect (captured by the term (P yL /P yE ) 1/(1−λ) ), encouraging innovation toward the sector with higher prices; the market size effect (captured by the term L/E f ), encouraging innovation in the sector with the larger market for specialized inputs.
Replacing in (45) P yL /P yE obtained in (37) and using (40) to eliminate E f /L we get:
An interior solution is characterized by the same opportunities of profit in the two research sectors, i.e., using also (43) and (44):
The existence of an interior solution requires 0 < sh < 1, which we will check ex post.
The two research sectors are owned by the representative consumer so that the profits earned by these research sectors are redistributed lump sum to her. Total transfers are now:
Finally, we make the assumption that there exist perfect knowledge spillovers such that the fossil energy-saving innovations made in the industrial sector perfectly diffuse to the durable goods sector.
Model in intensive variables
Equations (E1) to (E8), (E15), (E19) to (E23) are unchanged. The new equations are:
Calibration
The elasticities and the parameters that are in common with the first version of the model have the same value in this second version.
As for the new parameters, we retain λ = 0.3, c = 0.1, and we assume that the probability of success is the same in both research sectors, i.e. η L = η E . The results of the simulations are quite robust with respect to these assumptions.
The truly important assumption is the value given to sh. It is crucial because according to the value of sh, the split of research between the two sectors will be on one side or the other of the optimal split, which will have major consequences on the welfare effects of the simulations. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) suggests sh = 0.99 by counting the energy-saving related patents.
We perform two sets of simulation. In the first one, we assume that sh = 0.99. We find that the reforms we simulate induce a welfare gain, absent any external effect! This means that, given the calibration, the research effort toward fossil energy-saving technologies is too low so that an increase of oil taxes increases welfare, even without any climate change consideration.
We believe that this is a little too optimistic. This result is very sensitive to the baseline value of sh. As we have no clue (except for Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) ) on the true value of this parameter and we believe that other patents may have positive effects on energy-saving technologies, we prefer assuming that, in the baseline situation, one cannot increase welfare by adding a uniform tax (or subsidy) on energy. This is an agnostic point of view: we do not know whether, absent any externality, one should increase or decrease current taxation in order to stimulate or deter research toward energy saving technology. This leads us to take sh = 0.90 in a second set of simulation. Note that the choice of the initial sh has a large effect on welfare gains associated with the simulations, but other economic variables, such as production, investment, consumption of durables and energy do not vary a lot when changing the calibration of sh. In particular, the reform always goes with a decrease in GDP.
Simulations
The growth rate of energy efficiency g ae and the deflator of intensive variables g al are now
endogenous (and non-constant). The exogenous variables are intensive variables, (τ f /A e ) t . We simulate a shock on (τ f /A e ) t . It gives a path for g ae t , from which we deduce the path τ f,t . We iterate until we obtain the initial value and the time profile we want for τ f,t . We perform four simulations: the first two are identical to the ones in the previous section (carbon tax in the Quinet report and an oil shock), the third one incorporates an increase in the R&D subsidy, and the last one consists of a carbon tax enabling Factor 4 to be reached. As explained in the previous paragraph, when the initial value of sh is equal to 0.99, we find a welfare gain associated with the reform. When sh = 0.9, we find a welfare loss (see the first two columns of Table 6 ). The decrease in fossil fuel use is almost the same in both cases.
Simulation 1: Carbon tax of the Quinet Report
We now only present the simulations with sh = 0.9, for the reasons explained above. Fig.1 represents a number of economic variables, over time, when the carbon tax in the Quinet report is implemented, with exogenous technical progress (dashed line) and when the direction of technical progress is endogenous (solid line). The variable var C stands for the percentage change of C, compared to its baseline value 15 . The Quinet tax results in an increase in the rate of energy-saving technical progress, from 2% to more than 6% initially. This comes at a small cost in terms of overall growth: the labour-saving technical progress decreases from 1.6% to 1.2%. There is a 40% reduction in energy consumption associated with the reform, whereas there was a 26% reduction in the exogenous model, with the same shock. The decrease in demand for energy is due to the increase in the price and the increase in energy efficiency. 
Simulation 2: oil shock
We simulate the same oil shock as in the exogenous model. The shock on the oil price is as follows: from date 1 to date 40, the foreign oil price is the sum of the baseline price (increasing at a rate of 2%) and an additional price component increasing at a rate of 4% (like the Quinet tax in Simulation 1). The initial value of this additional price component is equal to 40% of the baseline price at date 1, as in the exogenous model. Fig.2 represents a number of economic variables over time, when the oil shock is simulated, with exogenous technical progress (dashed line) and when the direction of technical progress is endogenous (solid line). The oil shock results in an increase in the rate of energy-saving technical progress, from 2% to 6% initially. This comes at a small cost in terms of overall growth: the labour-saving technical progress 15 Note that it is not a percentage change compared to a date 0 value, but a percentage change compared to a baseline value at the same date. So that if var Ef = −0.3 in 2050 for instance, this means that E f is equal to 70% of its baseline value in 2050, which is less than 70% of its value in 2010, as the energy use decreases from 2010 to 2050 in the baseline.
decreases from 1.6% to 1.2%. As in the exogenous model, the welfare loss is higher than in Simulation 1, in which the price increase is trigered by a carbon tax ((see the third column of Even when the direction of technical progress is endogenous, the Quinet tax alone is not sufficient to reduce fossil fuel consumption by 75%. We simulate the impact of a Quinet tax associated with a subsidy τ r of 20% on energy saving R&D, such that the research profit in the energysaving sector is increased by 20%. The results are presented in Fig.3 (dotted line). The increase in the rate of energy-saving technical progress is huge, as it rises from 2% to almost 20%. The labour-saving technical progress on the other hand decreases to almost zero. The decrease in production is almost twice as great as it was with the Quinet tax alone (solid line in Fig.3 ). Even with this huge effort toward energy-saving technical progress, energy consumption decreases only by 60% within forty years (see the fourth column of Table 6 ). Increasing the subsidy even more would redirect all research efforts toward energy-saving technical progress and make the rate of labour-saving technical progress equal to zero for some time, which does not seem realistic or acceptable. In order to achieve a 75% reduction, we run another simulation, in which we increase the initial tax, as well as its rate of growth. In this last simulation, we simulate the impact of the following carbon tax value: its initial value is equal to 64 e per tonne of CO 2 , and it grows at a rate of 8%. In Fig.4 , the solid line represents the result of this simulation in the endogenous model, whereas the dashed line represents the results of the same simulation in the exogenous model. In the endogenous model, this carbon tax is enough to achieve the 75% target, but the welfare loss is high (equivalent to a forty years consumption loss of 3.29%, see Table 6 ). Contrary to previous simulations, the rate of labour-saving technical progress decreases over a long period. As a result, the production Y continues to decrease over time compared to its baseline value.
Conclusion
The conclusion we can draw from our simulations, both in the exogenous version of our model and in its endogenous version, is that the Factor 4 goal is very difficult to achieve for France.
Even when we make the rate of energy-saving technical progress endogenous, a 75% reduction in emissions seems almost impossible to achieve. According to our model, it would require a high carbon tax and/or high subsidies to fossil energy-saving technical progress and this would necessarily entail reduced growth for some time.
The results depend of course on the calibration, as do the results from existing large applied models. We have tried to make the model and the calibration as simple and transparent as possible, in order to disentangle the different effects. What seems very robust is the need for fossil energy-saving technical progress to achieve a substantial reduction in emissions. And this technical progress is likely to come at some cost. We wonder if the existing large applied models commonly used to study environmental policy are not misleading in the sense that they under-estimate the magnitude of the effort required to achieve the objective.
We find that achieving a significant reduction in emissions will probably come at a large cost in terms of welfare loss. This result is all the more striking that it relies on optimistic asumptions.
In particular, we did not model the fact that increasing the price of energy unilateraly would result in increased imports, loss of competitiveness and carbon leakages. This would worsen our results. This confirms the need for a global environmental policy, at least at the European level. Unfortunately, an ambitious European policy does not seem to be on the agenda, as the financial crisis has overshadowed environmental concerns.
However, our pessimistic results should be put into perspective, as we did not take into account carbon capture and sequestration, which represents an important part of the lowest cost greenhouse gas mitigation portefolio. Taking this technology into acount would alleviate the 31 pessimistic conclusion of the article. Moreover, we do not take into account the negative external effect of pollution here. This is not very realistic, but we made this choice in order to focus on a worst-case scenario, and answer this question: what is the loss associated with the reform if it does not yield any positive benefit? We think this question is relevant as the estimates of the benefits from mitigation vary greatly across studies.
A Estimation of the elasticity of substitution between durable goods and energy and of the rate of technical progress
Method
We follow Ogaki & Reinhart (1998) to identify a cointegration relation and estimate the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between E h and D. Let's denote W t the intertemporal welfare at date t. With obvious notations, first order conditions with respect to X t and E h,t lead to:
(1 + τ c t )P
We have
The expression of W E h,t is straightforward, and we obtain:
From F.O.C, we have the following relationship:
Multiplying both sides by A e t Xt A e t Et 1 ǫ , we get:
If we show that the discounted sum in the right-hand side member of (48) is stationary, we can conclude that the left-hand side member is also stationary. Assuming that A e t grows at a constant growth rate, A e t = A e 0 (1 + g ae ) t , we will hence be able to derive the following long run relationship:
where c is a constant and u t is a white noise. . We cannot prove empirically that its growth rate is stationary, but like Ogaki & Reinhart (1998) , we consider that the non-stationarity of this growth rate is unlikely to be empirically important.
We assess the stationarity of x t = ln(X t ) and e t = ln(E h,t ) by performing augmented Dickey
Fuller tests. We use annual data between 1959 and 2010 for x t , and between 1973 and 2010 for e t . We conclude that x t is difference stationary with a drift and a trend, and that e h,t is difference stationary with a drift, as presented in Table 7 . 
Then we test the stationarity of residuals. We perform a Dickey Fuller test on residuals. We find a statistic t = −2.37 which is below the 5% critical value of -1.95. We conclude that we can reject the unit root hypothesis and that the residuals are stationary. Comparing the estimated equation with equation (49), we see that γ is the elasticity of substitution ǫ and that β is equal to (ǫ − 1)g ae . So we have the following results: the elasticity of substitution between E h and D is ǫ = 0.50 and the rate of technical progress is g ae = 1.6%. B Estimation of the elasticities of substitution and the rates of technical progress in production
The two-level production function is given by equations (10) and (11). We deduce from the first order conditions (15)- (17), denoting x =Ẋ X and omitting the time index:
But z and p z cannot be observed. To get rid of them, we first add p k − p z on both sides of (53):
then use (51) to obtain
so that:
Then, denoting θ KZ the variation of the share in value of K in Z, we get:
Now adding to both sides of (52) the term p e − p z and using (51), we get:
Finally, we have the following three equations:
so that we have to estimate the system:
y 2 = β 21 x 21 + β 22 x 22 + ǫ 2 (58)
We proceed as in van der Werf (2008) . We estimate first the first equation separately. Then we estimate the system of the two last equations, with the following restrictions on coefficients:
1−β1 and β 22 = β 32 .
Results
If we do not include gas in the data (data on gas come from another source, Ceren) and run the regression from 1986, we find similar results: the elasticity of substitution between L and Z f is ρ = 0.52, the elasticity of substitution between K and E f is σ = 0.48, and the energy and labor efficiency growth rates are respectively g ae = 2.4% and g al = 1.5% (significant also).
Including gas, we find that the elasticity of substitution between L and Z f is ρ = 0.52. The elasticity of substitution between K and E f is σ = 0.52. The energy efficiency growth rate is g ae = 2.7% and the labour efficiency growth rate is g al = 1.5%. All the results are significant at 5% at least.
These results are consistent with those of Lalanne et al. (2009) .
C Energy taxes
This appendix presents what taxes on fossil energy represent in comparison to the initial price without taxes, for households and firms. Fossil fuels in France are taxed at TICPE (former TIPP) for petroleum products, TICGN for gases, and VAT. TICPE and TICGN are excise duties paid on the quantity consumed, and VAT applies on the price including those taxes. So the consumer price of oil products all taxes included is P AT I = (P + T ICP E)(1 + V AT ).
Many exemptions exist for the payment of TICPE for firms, but no one exists for households. On the contrary, the TICGN is not paid by households. Table 9 shows how the price is decomposed for each energy from fossil origin consumed by households. We do not present the details for gas consumption because it is only subject to VAT at normal rate 19.6%. Table 9 shows that the tax burden largely depends on the type of energy. We compute an average tax rate, including specific taxes on energy and VAT for households and firms. Households' consumption of fossil energies is available with details, as shown in Table 10 . With the tax rates presented in Table 9 , we find that the average tax rate for households' fossil energy consumption represents 77% of the price before tax (see Table 10 ). As shown in Table 9 , the extra cost of a 32 e/tCO2 tax depends on the type of energy. For instance, it represents 8.6 e per hectolitre for diesel and 7.7 e per hectolitre for gasoline, or, expressed as a percentage of the initial price, 16.2% and 14.8% respectively. We weight the different extra cost by relative consumption and obtain that a 32 e/tCO2 tax represents about 15% of the price before tax. from applying the same procedure. We start from total energy taxes on petroleum products, and infer the part paid by firms by subtracting the part paid by households from the total. We then add TIGCN, which is only paid by firms, and compute the average rate of taxes, in regard to firms intermediate consumption of fossil energies. Total TICPE collected in 2010 is e 23.9 bn (source: DGEC), whereas TICGN is e 0.3 bn. From our e 15 bn estimation of TICPE paid by households, we obtain that TICPE paid by firms is e 8.9 bn. So total taxes is e 9.2 bn.
Some firms are also covered by the European Trading Scheme, which puts constraint on their emissions. More precisely, the system puts an excess cost to fossil energy (emitting GHG), that can be interpreted as taxation. In 2010, the average price of permits was 13 e, and annual permits which were distributed amounted to 132 millions. We thus consider that it implies an excess cost of e 1.8 bn for firms.
We then retrieve from intermediate consumption of firms the amount paid for energy from fossil 39 origin. This corresponds to e 51.3 bn (tax on energy included) in 2010. So the tax rate applied to firms on energy from fossil origin is 9.2+1.8 51.3−9.2 = 26%.
D Welfare loss
D.1 Exogenous model
The intertemporal welfare writes :
ln C t+s (1 + µ) s or : 
